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BIEN VENUE: SEC V. JOHNSON AND THE POLICY
FOR BROAD PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS IN
PUBLIC SECURITIES ACTIONS
KELLY KYLIS+
A phone rings in Washington, D.C. The caller is a corporate representative,
located in Los Angeles, California, requesting a business meeting in Dallas,
Texas. The meeting takes place in Dallas, where individuals from the
corporation’s offices in Washington, D.C., California, Texas, Arizona, and
Massachusetts offices gather to discuss the corporation’s annual earnings
report. One attendee returns to the D.C. office and files the annual report with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). That report is fraudulent and,
upon a government investigation, the SEC files a lawsuit. Where can all the
co-conspirators be sued for their fraudulent actions?
In the modern global economy, business arrangements and transactions
involve numerous individuals located in many different places.1 Although
globalization benefits businesses, it complicates legal disputes. For instance, if
parties to a securities transaction jointly engage in fraud, but share no ties to
any single jurisdiction, where should a plaintiff bring suit against them?
Judicial efficiency calls for one lawsuit against all potential defendants,2 but
the requirements for establishing venue against multiple defendants are fairly
strict under the general federal venue statute.3 Courts have interpreted section
27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) to allow for an act
by one defendant in a securities fraud scheme to establish venue against all
defendants.4 Both private plaintiffs and the SEC have used this interpretation
+
J.D. Candidate, May 2013, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.A., 2009, University of Maryland. The author wishes to thank Professor Megan La Belle for
her exceptional guidance and unwavering support throughout the writing process and beyond.
The author also wishes to thank her family, friends, Catholic University Law Review staff
members, and the Salty Dog for all of their encouragement and assistance throughout law school
and the publication of this pursuit of proper venue.
1. See 5 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON
SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD, § 10:18 (2d ed. 2012) (noting that securities
transactions frequently involve individuals located in many places).
2. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1318 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that an
inconvenience to one defendant is less prejudicial than litigating the same cases several times).
3. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391 (West 2009 & Supp. 2012); see also BROMBERG & LOWENFELS,
supra note 1, § 10:18 (recognizing that the general venue statute’s requirements are increasingly
burdensome in the modern world of globalized corporate transactions).
4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). A
discussion of the concern among scholars and practitioners about whom to sue for violations of
the securities laws is beyond the scope of this Note. For more information, see 10b-5 Claim for
Securities Fraud: Whom to Sue?, WALL ST. L. BLOG (July 17, 2011),
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of section 27, known as the “co-conspirator theory of venue,” in civil securities
enforcement actions.5
Venue is the geographic location in which a case should be heard based on
the rules of convenience for the parties.6 In securities fraud cases, venue is
proper (1) in any jurisdiction where an “act or transaction constituting the
violation occurred;” or (2) where the defendant resides or does business.7 Only
one act in a jurisdiction by a defendant is sufficient to establish venue under
the securities laws.8 Under the co-conspirator theory of venue, in a suit
involving multiple defendants, an act by one defendant in a jurisdiction will
deem that jurisdiction as a proper venue as to all other co-defendants who
participated in the fraudulent scheme.9 In effect, the co-conspirator theory of
venue provides plaintiffs with great latitude to choose venue.10
In SEC v. Johnson, the SEC filed a civil enforcement action under section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act against six participants in an alleged
securities fraud scheme in Washington, D.C.11 One defendant, Christopher
Benyo, argued that venue was improper as to him because he did not engage in
any actions in Washington, D.C.12 The United States District Court for the
District of Columbia held that venue was proper under the co-conspirator

http://wallstreetlaw.typepad.com/sherman/2011/07/in-the-landmark-central-bank-of-denver-case
-the-us-supreme-court-ruled-that-there-is-no-private-right-of-action-available-ag.html.
5. See, e.g., Vigman, 764 F.2d at 1317–18 (citing Stewart v. Fry, 575 F. Supp. 753, 755
(E.D. Mo. 1983)); DeMoss v. First Artists Prod. Co. Ltd., 571 F. Supp. 409, 411–12 (N.D. Ohio
1983); Hill v. Turner, 492 F. Supp 61, 62–64 (M.D. Pa. 1980); SEC v. Diversified Indus., Inc.,
465 F. Supp. 104, 111 (D.D.C. 1979); Warren v. Bokum Res. Corp., 433 F. Supp. 1360, 1363–65
(D.N.M. 1977); Bertozzi v. King Louie Int’l, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1166, 1169–71 (D.R.I. 1976);
Arpet, Ltd. v. Homas, 390 F. Supp. 908, 911–12 (W.D. Pa. 1975); SEC v. Nat’l Student Mktg.
Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284, 291–94 (D.D.C. 1973).
6. 28 U.S.C.A § 1391; see also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, et al., FED. PRAC. & PROC.
JURISDICTION § 3801 (3d ed. 2011) (“‘Venue’ refers to locality, the place where a lawsuit should
be heard according to the applicable statutes or rules.” (footnote omitted)).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2010) (Supp. IV 2010).
8. See RMS Titanic, Inc. v. Geller, No. 3199CV2401 (JCH), 2000 WL 306997, at *3 (D.
Conn. Jan. 10, 2000) (citing Wharton v. Roth, 263 F. Supp. 922, 923 (E.D.N.Y. 1964) (“A single
act or transaction is sufficient to render venue appropriate.”).
9. Diversified Indus., Inc., 465 F. Supp. at 111 (“The co-conspirator venue theory, in
essence, provides: ‘any allegation of a securities act violation is sufficient for venue purposes
even as to a defendant who did not commit an act within the district if that defendant is in league
with a defendant who did act within the district.’” (quoting Levin v. Great W. Sugar Co., 274 F.
Supp. 974, 978 (D.N.J. 1967)).
10. See Ravenwoods Inv. Co., v. Bishop Capital Corp., No. 04CV926GKMK, 2005 WL
236440, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2005) (citing In re AES Corp. Sec. Lit., 240 F. Supp. 2d 557,
559–62 (E.D. Va. 2003)); see also 6 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
SECURITIES REGULATION, § 17.3 at 395–96 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing the broad venue
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
11. 650 F.3d 710, 712–13 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 956 (2011).
12. Id. at 713.
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theory of venue.13 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the co-conspirator theory
was inapplicable and venue was improper as to Benyo.14
This Note argues that the D.C. Circuit erred when it rejected
the co-conspirator theory of venue. Part I of this Note discusses venue in
federal courts and the special venue provision of the Exchange Act. By
analyzing the language and purpose of the Exchange Act, this Note shows that
the co-conspirator theory of venue, as used by the SEC in public enforcement
actions, is consistent with the language and spirit of securities law. Next, this
Note discusses the prior case law upholding the co-conspirator theory of venue
and illustrates how the D.C. Circuit Court erred in SEC v. Johnson. Finally,
this Note concludes by suggesting a congressional amendment to the Exchange
Act to include the co-conspirator theory of venue.
I. VENUE: THE RULES OF CONVENIENCE
A. Venue in Federal Courts, Generally
At common law, venue was controlled by the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, which allowed a court to decline to hear a case, even if it had legal
authority to hear it, when the interests of justice were better served by allowing
another forum to hear the case.15 The U.S. Supreme Court has outlined several
factors to help courts determine whether the interests of justice weigh in favor
of hearing the case in that venue, including access to sources of proof,
availability and cost of compulsory process for witnesses, possibility of view
of premises, easy, expeditious and inexpensive trial, and public interest.16
13. SEC v. Johnson, 565 F. Supp. 2d 82, 93 (D.D.C. 2008) (reasoning that the defendant
“aided and abetted a scheme, a material part of which occurred in the District of Columbia”),
rev’d, 650 F.3d 710 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 956 (2011).
14. Johnson, 650 F.3d at 715–16 (finding that the “SEC failed to lay venue in the District of
Columbia”).
15. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) (noting that “the principle of
forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when
jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute”), superseded by statute, Pub. L.
104-317, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006), as recognized in Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S.
443, 449 n.2 (1994); see also Robert Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HARV. L.
REV. 908, 909 (1947) (discussing the origins of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, which is
believed to have come to the United States from Scotland).
16. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508 (“It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice of an
inconvenient forum, ‘vex,’ ‘harass,’ or ‘oppress’ the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or
trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue his remedy. But unless the balance is strongly in
favor of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.”). Later cases
have referred to this balancing test as the “Gilbert Analysis.” See, e.g., Piper Aircraft v. Reyno,
454 U.S. 235, 244 (1981); see also Braucher, supra note 15, at 930 (noting that “the principal
characteristic of [the doctrine of forum non conveniens] is its absurd complexity”). The
complexity of this doctrine led Congress to enact 28 U.S.C. § 1404, which provides for a venue
transfer for the convenience of the parties and witnesses. See David E. Steinberg, The Motion to
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Given the difficulty in balancing these factors, Congress defined venue for
federal courts in 28 U.S.C. § 1391.17 Section 1391(b) states that:
A civil action may be brought in—(1) a judicial district in which any
defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which
the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part
of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a
substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated;
or
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought
as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any
defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect
to such action.18
Although venue is proper anywhere personal jurisdiction exists, venue is
distinct from personal jurisdiction19 and determined after personal jurisdiction
has been established.20 However, similar to personal jurisdiction, a defendant
may waive venue by not objecting to it at the outset of litigation.21
A defendant has recourse if the plaintiff’s choice of forum is unduly
burdensome.22 Defendants may either challenge venue as improper, under 28
U.S.C. § 1406,23 or inconvenient, under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).24 If venue is
Transfer and the Interests of Justice, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 443, 450–52 (1990) (discussing
the development of § 1404).
17. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391 (West 2009 & Supp. 2012).
18. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(b).
19. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979) (citing WRIGHT, supra note
6, at § 3801) (defining personal jurisdiction as “the court’s power to exercise control over the
parties”); Gulf Ins. Co. v. Glasbrenner, 417 F.3d 353, 357 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing United States ex
rel. Rudick v. Laird, 412 F.2d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1969)) (“The concepts of personal jurisdiction and
venue are closely related but nonetheless distinct.”); E. Lawrence Vincent, Defining ‘Doing
Business’ to Determine Corporate Venue, 65 TEX. L. REV. 153, 154 (1986) (discussing the
different functions served by venue and personal jurisdiction).
20. Leroy, 443 U.S. at 180 (noting that personal jurisdiction is generally decided before
venue).
21. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343 (1960) (acknowledging that venue is waived if an
objection is not raised); Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 324 U.S. 635, 639,
(1945) (asserting that “venue may be lost unless seasonably asserted”).
22. 28 U.S.C.A § 1404(a) (West 2009 & Supp. 2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (2006). In Leroy,
the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that the venue statute provided protection to the defendant in
addition to the protection provided by the personal jurisdiction doctrine. Leroy, 443 U.S.
at 183–84; see Mitchell G. Page, After the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990: Does the General
Federal Venue Statute Survive as a Protection for Defendants?, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1153, 1161
(2003) (discussing venue as an additional protection for defendants); see also WRIGHT, supra
note 6, § 3801 (“[T]he laws relating to venue give added protection to defendants beyond those
that are provided by the statutory and constitutional prerequisites of personal jurisdiction.”).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (stating that a court cannot hear a case if venue is improper and
must either dismiss it or transfer it to a proper forum).
24. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) (giving courts latitude to transfer a case “in the interest of
justice”).
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improper under §1406, a judge must either dismiss or transfer the case to a
proper forum.25 By contrast, challenging venue under §1404 provides the
defendant the option to seek a transfer for the convenience of the parties or
witnesses, which the court has discretion to grant.26 Because a plaintiff’s
choice of venue is given substantial weight, a defendant who objects to venue
on the basis of convenience bears the difficult burden of showing that the
interests of convenience and justice substantially outweigh the plaintiff’s
choice of venue.27
In addition to the general federal venue statute, Congress has enacted
“special” venue provisions that are applied in particular cases.28 Specific
provisions in the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the Exchange Act
govern venue for disputes arising under the securities laws.29 These provisions
are considered “other law” under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, and therefore these
provisions, not the §1391 general venue statute, govern venue for all cases
brought under the securities laws.30

25. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (requiring dismissal or transfer for improper venue).
26. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) (providing that a court may transfer an action to another forum).
27. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a); see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947)
(discussing the balancing test that is used to decide whether a case should be transferred for the
convenience of the parties and witnesses). To determine whether to transfer for forum non
conveniens, the court weighs factors such as: availability of proof, compulsory process and jury
view of the premises, practical problems of inexpensive and expeditious trial, public interest
considerations, and the interest of the plaintiff in his choice of forum. Id.; see also David E.
Pearson, Transfer of Venue Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a): All Things to All People, or, Cracking
Under the Weight of the Forum Selection Clause, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 925, 952 (2002) (discussing
the difficulty in achieving a transfer under § 1404(a) and its similarity to the forum non
conveniens analysis); Steinberg, supra note 16, at 509 (discussing the development of the motion
to transfer venue, concluding that the law “is in chaos” and that, although “Congress intended
section 1404 to promote convenient and efficient litigation, the current multifactor balancing
approach insures that transfer litigation will be neither quick nor inexpensive”).
28. See Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 229 (1957) (declining
to apply the general venue statute to a patent infringement case because a special venue provision
was applicable); Zorn v. Anderson, 263 F. Supp. 745, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (applying the specific
venue provision, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa, to a securities law case). A special venue provision also exists
for litigation under antitrust laws. PHILIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS:
PROCEDURAL LAW 201 (1983).
29. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (Supp. IV 2010); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (Supp. IV 2010).
30. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391 (West 2009 & Supp. 2012) (providing that “except otherwise
provided by law” the venue provision of §1391 applies to federal cases) (emphasis added); see
Rhett Traband, The Case Against Applying the Co-Conspiracy Venue Theory in Private Securities
Actions, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 227, 231–32 (1999) (citing Zorn, 263 F. Supp. at 747) (noting the
difference between the general and specific venue statutes in the United States Code and
discussing the application of the specific venue statutes in the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act).
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B. The Special Venue Provisions Under the Securities Acts
The Securities Act and the Exchange Act’s special venue provisions provide
plaintiffs with a broad choice of forum in securities fraud actions.31 However,
when plaintiffs bring an action under both the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act, the venue provision of the Exchange Act will apply to the whole action.32
1. The Securities Act and the Exchange Act
In order to fully analyze secondary liability under the special venue
provisions, it is important to first understand the intended purpose of both the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act. Under the Securities Act,33 any
company wishing to issue securities must register with the SEC and disclose
“material facts” that a reasonable investor would want to know, such as
financial information about the company.34 If a company fails to adhere to
these requirements, it may be subject to criminal prosecution initiated by the
Department of Justice (DOJ) or a civil enforcement action by the SEC.35

31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v, 78aa; see Ravenwoods Inv. Co. v. Bishop Capital Corp., No.
04CV9266KMK, 2005 WL 236440, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2005) (noting that 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
“afford[s] broad venue options to securities fraud plaintiffs”).
32. The venue provision of the Exchange Act is broader than the venue provision of the
Securities Act. See Allen v. Byrne, No. 3:07-cv-060109, 2008 WL 763066, at *3 (N.D. Tex.
2008) (citing Hilgeman v. Nat’l Ins. Co. of Am., 547 F.2d 298, 301 n.7 (5th Cir. 1977)); Ingram
Indus., Inc. v. Nowicki, 527 F. Supp. 683, 687 (E.D. Ky. 1981).
33. Congress enacted the Securities Act in the wake of the stock market crash of 1929 to
accomplish two primary goals: (1) require public disclosure and (2) prohibit fraud in the sale of
securities. See The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last modified Aug. 30, 2012); see also Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 1–5 (1933))
(“The Securities Act of 1933 . . . was designed to provide investors with full disclosure of
material information concerning public offerings of securities in commerce, to protect investors
against fraud and . . . promote ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing.”).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 77q provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities . . . by the use of
any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or
by use of the mails, directly or indirectly (1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud, or (2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading; or (3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q (2006); see also THOMAS LEE HAZEN, FEDERAL SECURITES LAW 35–36 (2d
2003) (“Rule 405 defines ‘material’ as ‘matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable investor would attach importance in determining whether to purchase the security
registered.’”).
35. HAZEN, supra note 34, at 11 (stating that violations of the law are subject to both civil
and criminal consequences).
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The Exchange Act established the SEC and governs trading securities in
secondary markets.36 The SEC is authorized to bring both administrative and
civil enforcement actions against corporations.37 Among other things, the SEC
enforces section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, known as the general anti-fraud
provision, which prohibits manipulative or deceptive practices in securities
transactions.38
2. Secondary Liability and Central Bank of Denver
Although the Securities Act and the Exchange Act do not expressly include
liability for secondary acts, courts previously had found secondary liability for
persons who indirectly assist in the commission of securities fraud in all
cases.39 Despite the overwhelming acceptance of a private cause of action for
aiding and abetting securities fraud by federal courts,40 in Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, the Supreme Court rejected such
secondary liability under section 10(b).41 In Central Bank of Denver,
36. The Securities Act of 1933, 25 U.S.C. §§ 77 et seq. See also HAZEN, supra note 34, at 3
(“The 1934 Act regulates all aspects of public trading of securities.”); see also The Investor’s
Advocate: How the S.E.C. Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital
Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#create (last modified Nov. 12, 2012)
[hereinafter The Investor’s Advocate] (“The Act empowers the SEC with broad authority over all
aspects of the securities industry. This includes the power to register, regulate, and oversee
brokerage firms, transfer agents, and clearing agencies as well as the nation’s securities self
regulatory organizations (SROs).”). The SEC is an independent agency, and is often considered
“a true superagency” because it “exercises most administrative powers, with one exception: It
cannot adjudicate disputes between private parties.” HAZEN, supra note 34, at 3. The SEC was
formed to “protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital
formation.” The Investor’s Advocate, supra, at 1.
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t, 78(u), 78u-2 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); see SEC Enforcement Actions,
17 C.F.R. § 202.5 (2011); see also HAZEN, supra note 34, at 17 (“The SEC has direct
prosecutorial authority to enforce the 1934 Act in court with civil suits for injunctions and
ancillary relief against alleged violators. Should a criminal violation exist, the SEC Division of
Enforcement refers it to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution.”).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)(b) (2006); Barbara J. Finnegan, To Catch a Thief: The
Misappropriation Theory and Securities Fraud, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 692, 695 (1987) (noting that
10(b) is “a general fraud provision” that has provided the SEC with “general regulatory powers
over securities transactions”).
39. See David J. Baum, The Aftermath of Central Bank of Denver: Private Aiding and
Abetting Liability Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 44 AM. U. L REV. 1817, 1819–20 (1995).
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co. was the first time a court held, using the
common law of torts, that a defendant was liable for aiding and abetting under section 10(b); see
also Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 681–81 (N.D. Ind. 1966),
aff’d, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969); Carrie E. Goodwin, Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank: Not
Just the End of Aiding and Abetting Under Section 10(b), 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1387, 1393–94 (1995) (discussing the evolution of aiding and abetting liability in securities fraud
cases).
40. Goodwin, supra note 39, at 1395.
41. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 192 (1994),
superseded by statute, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
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bondholders sued Central Bank, the trustee for the bonds, for aiding and
abetting fraud after the bond issuer defaulted on the bonds.42 The Supreme
Court held that because the securities statute did not expressly provide for
secondary liability, nor prohibit aiding and abetting, the plaintiffs could not
maintain their action against Central Bank.43
Central Bank of Denver’s limitation could have been far-reaching.44 In
order to avoid such a result, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), which, among other things, expanded the
SEC’s authority to include enforcement of aiding and abetting liability.45
737 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e)), as recognized in Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC
v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 522 U.S. 148, 162 (2008).
42. Id. at 167–68. The Court described the facts surrounding Central Bank’s alleged
participation in the fraud that gave rise to plaintiff’s claim for aiding and abetting as:
In January 1988, [Central Bank was provided] with an updated appraisal of the land
securing the 1986 bonds and of the land proposed to secure the 1988 bonds . . . . Soon
afterwards, Central Bank received a letter from the senior underwriter for the 1986
bonds. Noting that property values were declining . . . the underwriter expressed
concern . . . . [Central Bank’s] in-house appraiser decided that the values listed in the
appraisal appeared optimistic . . . [,and he] suggested that Central Bank retain an
outside appraiser to conduct an independent review of the 1988 appraisal . . . . Central
Bank agreed to delay independent review of the appraisal until the end of the year, six
months after the June 1988 closing on the bond issue. Before the independent review
was complete, however, the [bond issuer] defaulted on the 1988 bonds.
Id.
43. Id. at 191–92 (“Because the text of § 10(b) does not prohibit aiding and abetting, we
hold that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b).”).
However, the Court permitted liability for secondary actors if the elements to establish primary
liability were met. Id. Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank of Denver left
unanswered the question of whether to apply primary liability to secondary actors in securities
fraud cases. See Andrew S. Gold, Reassessing the Scope of Conduct Prohibited by Section 10(b)
and the Elements of Rule 10b-5: Reflection on Securities Fraud and Secondary Actors, 53 CATH.
U. L. REV. 667, 668–70 (2004) (discussing the various tests applied by lower courts and the SEC
to avoid Central Bank of Denver’s holding).
44. Baum, supra note 39, at 1838 (noting that the Central Bank of Denver decision
“eliminated a powerful weapon” to reach individuals like lawyers and accountants who were not
directly involved in the securities fraud, but provided some degree of assistance).
45. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737,
§ 104 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e)). Several members of Congress have also argued, to
no avail, for a private cause of action for aiding and abetting. See 155 CONG. REC. 8,564 (2009)
(declining to provide for a private action for aiding and abetting securities fraud); Jim Hamilton,
Specter Amendment Having Last Hurrah, JIM HAMILTON’S WORLD OF SECURITIES REGULATION
(June 22, 2010), http://jimhamiltonblog.blogspot.com/2010/06/specter-amendment-having-last-hu
rrah.html (discussing the proposed amendment to include a private right of action for aiding and
abetting, introduced by Senator Specter); see also GAO, Securities Fraud Liability of Secondary
Actors, GAO-11-664, at 3–6, 30–46 (2011) [hereinafter Securities Fraud Liability] (reporting on
the state of securities litigation involving secondary actors and discussing the arguments for and
against imposing a private cause of action for secondary liability); Melissa C. Nunziato, Aiding
and Abetting, a Madoff Family Affair: Why Secondary Actors Should Be Held Accountable for
Securities Fraud Through the Restoration of the Private Right of Action for Aiding and Abetting
Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws, 73 ALB. L. REV. 603, 605 (2010) (using the Bernie
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3. Venue Provisions Under the Securities Laws
Section 22(a) of the Securities Act (15 U.S.C. § 77v) and section 27 of the
Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 78aa) provide that venue is proper (1) in the district
where any act or transaction constituting a violation occurred; or (2) in the
district where the defendant is found, is an inhabitant, or transacts business.46
These venue provisions provide plaintiffs broad choice and “home field
advantage,” thus fulfilling the statutory purpose of the securities acts.47 The
language of the venue provision of the Exchange Act is “manifestly broad,”
and therefore courts have “[a]ppropriately . . . construed the provision broadly,
holding that the ‘venue-sustaining act need not constitute the core of the
alleged violation, nor even be illegal, so long as it represents more than an
immaterial part of the alleged violations.’”48 One common example of an act
that is sufficient to satisfy venue requirements is the filing of misleading or
fraudulent documents.49 Courts have stated that, as a matter of law, venue is
proper in Washington, D.C., when fraudulent documents are filed with the
Madoff Ponzi scheme to argue that Congress should pass legislation allowing a private right of
action for secondary liability). Note, however, that the DOJ has authority to bring a criminal
action against aiders and abettors. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2006). Additionally, states can, and have,
enacted their own securities statutes to include private liability for aiding and abetting liability.
See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997: Hearing on S. 1260 Before the
Subcomm. On Securities, S. Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 47
(1997) (prepared statement of Arthur Levitt, Jr., Chairman, & Isaac C. Hunt, Jr., Commissioner,
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission); Securities Fraud Liability, supra, at 3 (“[M]any
states’ ‘blue sky laws’ impose express private liability for secondary actors.”). Further, some
scholars argue that regulation by the states is a more efficient and successful way to protect
investors from securities fraud. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE
FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES REGULATION 43 (2002).
46. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (Supp. IV 2010); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (Supp. IV 2010).
47. See Clapp v. Stearns & Co., 229 F. Supp. 305, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (stating that the
Exchange Act includes a “policy to provide a forum for suits involving multi-state frauds, no
matter how many states the defendants are citizens”). Opponents of the co-conspirator theory
argue that the “home field advantage” is unwarranted, and that the theory makes securities laws
too “plaintiff-friendly.” See Traband, supra note 30, at 228 (arguing that “[t]he co-conspiracy
venue theory prejudices defendants, because it: (a) bases a decision on venue on the pleadings
and affidavits which must be construed in a plaintiff’s favor and improperly advances discovery
at an early stage in the case; (b) eliminates the foreseeability and knowledge components of venue
and creates an inability to predict where suit can be brought; (c) generally affects ancillary
defendants; and (d) enables individual plaintiffs to sue under favorable state securities laws”).
48. In re AES Corp. Sec. Litig., 240 F. Supp. 2d 557, 559 (E.D. Va. 2003) (quoting S-G
Sec., Inc. v. Funqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1121 (D. Mass. 1978)).
49. See e.g., SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 1149, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (stating that
the defendant must concede that venue is proper because the case is governed by §78aa); RMS
Titanic, Inc. v. Geller, No. 3199CV2401 (JCH), 2000 WL 306997, at *4 (D. Conn. Jan. 10, 2000)
(stating that the act establishing venue “need not be illegal so long as it is material”); Bolton v.
Gramlich, 540 F. Supp. 822, 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (citing Hilgeman v. Nat’l Ins. Co., 547 F.2d
298, 301 (5th Cir. 1977)); Ingram Indust., Inc. v. Nowicki, 527 F. Supp. 683, 689 (E.D. Ky.
1981).
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SEC because the filing constitutes an act sufficient to establish venue in the
District.50
C. Co-Conspirator Theory of Venue: Bringing Down All Scheming Defendants
Together
The co-conspirator theory of venue affords plaintiffs great latitude in
choosing the forum for a lawsuit against all defendants.51 For years, plaintiffs
(including the SEC) have relied on the co-conspirator theory of venue to sue all
parties in a securities fraud scheme in one forum.52 The co-conspirator theory
of venue provides that “[a]ny allegation of a securities act violation is
sufficient for venue purposes even as to a defendant who did not commit an act
within [a certain] district if that defendant is in league with a defendant who
did act within [that] . . . district.”53 However, the co-conspirator venue theory
requires an action by at least one defendant that is sufficient to establish venue
in order to extend venue to the co-conspirators.54

50. See John Nuveen & Co. v. N.Y.C. Hous. Dev. Corp., Nos. 86C2583, 86C2817, 1986
WL 5780, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 9, 1986) (“Venue will be sustained in a securities case where a
defendant causes false or misleading information to be transmitted into a judicial district, even if
the defendant never has been physically present in that district.” (quoting Oxford First Corp. v.
PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 197 (E.D. Pa. 1974))); see also Savoy Indus., Inc., 587
F.2d at 1154; In re AES Corp. Sec. Litig., 240 F. Supp. 2d at 559 (stating that “the case law
uniformly supports the proposition that the alleged transmission of the misleading materials into
the district is a venue-sustaining act under § 78aa”).
51. See Traband, supra note 30, at 266–67 (“Because the co-conspiracy venue theory
permits plaintiffs to choose from a much broader choice of venue, it enables plaintiffs to pick and
choose which state’s securities law claims they wish to pursue. The co-conspiracy venue theory
thus greatly enhances forum shopping.”). This is in-line with the generally broad language of the
venue provisions governing securities law, which are preferential to the plaintiff’s choice of
venue. See Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for a Venue: The Need for More Limits on
Choice, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 267, 271 (1995) (providing examples of factors that aid a plaintiff
in choosing venue).
52. See HAZEN, supra note 10, at 396–97 (“In multi-defendant and multi-forum securities
fraud actions . . . any act committed, material to and in furtherance of an alleged fraudulent
scheme by any defendant, will satisfy the 1934 Act venue requirement as to all defendants.”).
53. SEC v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 104, 111 (D.D.C. 1979) (quoting Levin v.
Great W. Sugar Co., 274 F. Supp. 974, 978 (D.N.J. 1967)).
54. See FS Photo, Inc. v. PictureVision, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 442, 446 (D. Del. 1999) (citing
Southmark Prime Plus, L.P. v. Falzone, 768 F. Supp. 487, 489 (D. Del. 1991)) (stating that “the
co-conspirator venue theory only applies where venue has been established over one conspirator
by reason of an act or transaction performed in the district by that conspirator in furtherance of
the conspiracy,” and, therefore, holding that venue in Delaware was improper when it could not
be established that any defendant committed an act in Delaware).
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1. Acceptance of the Co-Conspirator Theory Across Jurisdictions
The earliest courts to apply the co-conspirator theory were federal district
courts in Delaware, New York, and New Jersey.55 In 1955, a federal district
court in New York held that venue was proper in New York for a non-New
Yorker based on his participation in the securities fraud scheme, even though
he had never visited New York.56 Likewise, in 1980, a federal district court in
Pennsylvania explicitly adopted the theory, noting that it was “widely
accepted” and consistent with the language of § 78aa.57 By the early 1980s, it
became clear that courts around the country had embraced the theory in
securities fraud cases.58
Currently, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits, as well as federal district courts around the country,
endorse the co-conspirator theory of venue.59 These courts recognize that the
theory accomplishes the purpose of the securities laws and the broad purpose
of venue generally.60 The D.C. Circuit in Johnson became the first court to

55. Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416, 429 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (discussing the
development of the co-conspirator theory of venue); Traband, supra note 30, at 243–44 (citing
Dauphin Corp. v. Redwall Corp., 201 F. Supp. 466, 469–70 (D. Del. 1962) and Townsend Corp.
of America v. Davidson, 222 F. Supp. 1, 2–3 (D.N.J. 1963) as two of the earliest cases to apply
the co-conspirator theory in securities actions).
56. Thiele, 131 F. Supp. at 420 n.4 (holding that “[a]part from the conspiracy allegation, his
actions would not be sufficient”).
57. Hill v. Turner, 492 F. Supp. 61, 63–64 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (citing Hilgeman v. Nat’l Ins.
Co. of Am., 547 F.2d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 1977)) (adopting the co-conspirator theory of venue
because “the ‘co-conspiracy’ theory of extended venue is widely accepted . . . [and because] the
principle coincides well with the language and judicial interpretation of [section 78aa]”); see also
Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 758–59 (5th Cir. 1974); Wyndham Assocs. v. Bintliff,
398 F.2d 614, 620 (2d Cir. 1968); Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Ritter, 371 F.2d 145, 148 (10th Cir.
1967).
58. See, e.g., Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1317–18 (9th Cir. 1985)
(citing Stewart v. Fry, 575 F. Supp. 753, 755 (E.D. Mo. 1983)); DeMoss v. First Artists Prod.
Co., 571 F. Supp. 409, 411–12 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Hill, 492 F. Supp. at 63–64; SEC v. Diversified
Indus., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 104, 111 (D.D.C. 1979); Warren v. Bokum Res. Corp., 433 F. Supp
1360, 1364 (D.N.M. 1977); Bertozzi v. King Louie Int’l, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1116,
1170–71 (D.R.I. 1976); Arpet v. Homas, 390 F. Supp. 908, 911 (W.D. Pa. 1975); SEC v. Nat’l
Student Mktg. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284, 291–92 (D.D.C. 1973); Levin v. Great W. Sugar Co., 274
F. Supp. 974, 977–78 (D.N.J. 1967); Zorn v. Anderson, 263 F. Supp. 745, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)).
59. See Vigman, 764 F.2d at 1316–18; Hilgeman, 547 F.2d at 301–02; Bath Indus., Inc. v.
Bolt, 427 F.2d 97, 114 (7th Cir. 1970); Wyndham Assocs., 398 F.2d at 620. If these Circuits
continue to apply the co-conspirator theory of venue, a circuit split may arise. See CAHILL,
GORDON, REINDELL, LLP, D.C. Circuit Rejects “Co-Conspirator Theory of Venue” in Securities
Litigation (July 5, 2011), http://www.cahill.com/news/memoranda/1012913/_res/id=sa_File1/C
GR%20Memo%20%20D.C.%20Circuit%20Rejects%20’CoConspirator%20Theory%20of%20Ve
nue’%20In%20Securities%20Litigation.pdf.
60. See, e.g., Vigman, 764 F.2d at 1316–18 (recognizing the “strong policy favoring the
litigation of related claims in the same forum”); In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litig., 338 F. Supp 438,
440 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (stating that it may be impossible “to accomplish [the] purpose [of the
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reject this theory of venue.61
2. Prior Application of the Co-Conspirator Theory of Venue in Washington,
D.C.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, similar to other federal
district courts, has a longstanding history of consistently applying the coconspirator theory of venue in securities fraud cases.62 For example, in SEC v.
National Student Marketing Corp., the D.C. district court noted that “it is well
recognized that in multi-defendant and multi-forum securities fraud actions,
any act committed material to and in furtherance of an alleged fraudulent
scheme will satisfy the venue requirement of the Exchange Act as to all
defendants wherever the defendants are found.”63 Further, in Jarmuth v.
Turetsky, the D.C. district court emphasized that securities fraud cases are the
only type of cases to which a “conspiratorial theory of venue in civil cases”
applies.64 Despite the D.C. district court’s adjudication of many co-conspirator
cases brought by the SEC, Johnson is the first time that the D.C. Circuit has
addressed this issue.

Exchange Act] if, when a complex scheme is alleged involving defendants from many states,
venue for a particular district would have to be established as to each alleged participant in the
illegal plan by proving that his illegal acts in furtherance of the fraud were committed in that
district”).
61. The co-conspirator theory of venue has not applied only in those cases where the
requirements for the use of the theory are not met. See, e.g., FS Photo, Inc. v. PictureVision, Inc.,
48 F. Supp. 2d 442, 446 (D. Del. 1999) (holding that it was not established that any of the
defendants performed an act or transaction in furtherance of the conspiracy alleged in Delaware;
therefore, the co-conspirator theory did not apply).
62. See, e.g., Schreiber v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 382 F. Supp. 297, 299 (D.D.C 1974)
(applying the co-conspirator theory of venue in a securities fraud litigation); SEC v. Nat’l Student
Mktg. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284, 292 (D.D.C. 1973) (acknowledging that the co-conspirator theory
applies for securities fraud involving multi-defendants and several forums).
63. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., 360 F. Supp. at 292.
64. 815 F. Supp. 4, 6 (D.D.C. 1993) (citing CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, supra note 6,
§ 3807 (2d ed. 1986)) (“There seems to be general acceptance of this theory in civil cases
involving securities laws . . . .”). The co-conspirator theory of venue has been much more widely
accepted in securities fraud cases than any other specialized venue provisions. Traband, supra
note 30, at 250–51; see HAZEN, supra note 10, at 395–96 (discussing how the co-conspirator
theory been so widely accepted as in securities law). For example, after Bankers Life & Casualty
Co. v. Holland, in which the Supreme Court rejected the use of the co-conspirator theory of venue
in an antitrust case, multiple courts held that the co-conspirator theory is no longer accepted in
antitrust cases. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953); Traband,
supra note 30, at 250 (citing Piedmont Label Co. v. Sun Garden Packing Co., 598 F.2d 491, 492
(9th Cir. 1979)); see also In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 283–84 (4th Cir. 2007)
(noting that antitrust plaintiffs have no “statutory right” to try all antitrust co-conspirators in the
same district); San Antonio Tel. Co. v. AT&T, 499 F.2d 349, 351 n.3 (5th Cir. 1974); H.L. Moore
Drug Exch., Inc. v. Smith, Kline & French Labs, 384 F.2d 97, 98 (2d Cir. 1967).
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II. SEC V. JOHNSON: THE LAST APPEARANCE OF THE CO-CONSPIRATOR
THEORY OF VENUE UNDER § 78AA?
A. Defendant Benyo’s Venue Objection
In January 2005, the SEC filed a civil enforcement action against
Christopher Benyo and six other defendants in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia.65 Two of the defendants were America Online (AOL)
executives and four, including Benyo, were employees of PurchasePro, a
company that made software for online “business-to-business” sales.66 The
alleged scheme for which the SEC brought action was based on “sham
transactions” executed by PurchasePro on a series of sales made for the
purpose of inflating the company’s revenue.67 To effectuate the scheme, AOL
referred third-parties to purchase PurchasePro software licenses, but AOL and
PurchasePro financed those third-party licenses in accordance with a side
agreement.68 This undisclosed side agreement made each transaction appear to
generate revenue for PurchasePro.69 The SEC filed an enforcement action for
violations under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, including a count of aiding
and abetting securities fraud against Benyo.70
Benyo, a resident of Nevada, argued that venue was improper in
Washington, D.C., because he did not engage in any actions in the District to
establish venue there.71 The district court agreed with the SEC’s application of
the co-conspirator theory of venue and held that venue was proper as to
Benyo.72 The district court subsequently found Benyo liable for aiding and
abetting securities fraud.73 Benyo appealed to the D.C. Circuit, arguing that
65. SEC v. Johnson, 565 F. Supp. 2d 82, 84 (D.D.C. 2008), rev’d, 650 F.3d 710, 713 (D.C.
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 956 (2011). The SEC brought the action on the same day that
the Department of Justice filed a criminal action in the Eastern District of Virginia against the
same defendants for the same securities fraud. Johnson, 650 F.3d at 713. Defendant Benyo was
acquitted of the charges against him in the criminal action. Id.
66. Johnson, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 84.
67. Johnson, 650 F.3d at 712.
68. Id. (revealing that PurchasePro did not report these side agreements resulting in inflated
revenue for PurchasePro).
69. Id. (noting that these “sham transactions” appeared “on paper to generate a substantial
amount of revenue for PurchasePro”). When the fraud was uncovered by PurchasePro auditors
and attorneys, PurchasePro excluded the fraudulent revenue from its SEC report and reported
only $16 million in revenue, about half of the $30 million in revenue it had publicly reported just
a month earlier. Id.
70. Johnson, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 84–85.
71. Johnson, 650 F.3d at 713 (noting that Benyo filed an answer, a motion for summary
judgment, and a motion for judgment as a matter of law, all arguing that his alleged fraudulent
actions occurred in Nevada, not Washington, D.C.).
72. Johnson, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 93 (holding that “[b]ecause Benyo aided and abetted a
scheme, a material part of which occurred in the District of Columbia, venue . . . is proper in this
District”).
73. Id. (holding that Benyo violated 15 U.S.C. § 78(t)(e) (2006)).
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the district court erred in applying the co-conspirator theory of venue because
the theory did not exist under section 10(b) of the securities laws.74
B. The D.C. Circuit’s Fatal Blow
The D.C. Circuit began its opinion by flatly rejecting the co-conspirator
theory of venue, stating that “the co-conspirator theory of venue is but a gloss
upon and an extension of § 78aa.”75 The court relied on two Supreme Court
cases as grounds for its rejection: Central Bank of Denver v. First Bank of
Denver and Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland.76 In Central Bank of
Denver, the Supreme Court held that there was no private cause of action for
aiding and abetting under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.77 The D.C.
Circuit held that the co-conspirator theory of venue was inconsistent with
§ 78aa on the basis that if there is no action for secondary liability post Central
Bank,78 venue cannot be based on a claim of secondary liability.79 The D.C.
Circuit further noted that all of the circuit courts that had previously accepted
the co-conspirator theory of venue “pre-date Central Bank of Denver.”80
Next, the D.C. Circuit noted that in Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland,
the Supreme Court rejected the use of the co-conspirator theory of venue in
antitrust cases.81 Although some circuits, even after Bankers Life, applied the
co-conspirator theory of venue in securities enforcement actions for policy
reasons,82 the D.C. Circuit found that “[p]olicy considerations cannot override
our interpretation of the text and structure of the [Exchange] Act.”83

74. Corrected Brief of Appellant Benyo at 43, Johnson, 650 F.3d 710 (No. 09-5399); see 15
U.S.C. § 78(j) (2006); Johnson, 650 F.3d at 714 (“[T]he question . . . is whether the extension [of
§ 78aa by the co-conspirator theory of venue] is consistent with the terms of § 78aa.”).
75. Johnson, 650 F.3d at 714.
76. Id. at 714–16 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S.
164, 192 (1994), superseded by statute, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No.
104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e)), as recognized in Stoneridge
Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 522 U.S. 148, 162 (2008); and Bankers Life
& Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379 (1953)).
77. Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 191.
78. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
79. Johnson, 650 F.3d at 714–15.
80. Id. (citing Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1317–18 (9th Cir. 1985);
Hilgeman v. Nat’l Ins. Co. of Am., 547 F.2d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 1977); Wyndham Assocs. v.
Bintliff, 398 F.2d 614, 620 (2d Cir. 1968)) (questioning whether Central Bank of Denver
precludes reliance on earlier decisions).
81. Id. at 715 (citing Bankers Life, 346 U.S. at 384) (noting that this, “as a practical matter,
was the end of the co-conspirator theory of venue in antitrust”).
82. Id. (noting that the Second and Ninth Circuits permit the theory for securities fraud
cases based upon “‘strong policy favoring the litigation of related claims in the same forum’”
(quoting Vigman, 764 F.2d at 1318)).
83. Id. (quoting Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 188) (citing Leroy v. Great W. United
Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 181–82, 182–83 n.14 (1979); Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S.
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Therefore, the court concluded that despite long-term use of the co-conspirator
theory by many circuits,84 the “so-called theory” was inconsistent with the
“straightforward language” of the venue provision of the Exchange Act.85
Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court and dismissed the case
without prejudice.86
III. THE D.C. CIRCUIT ERRED IN REJECTING THE CO-CONSPIRATOR THEORY
OF VENUE IN SEC V. JOHNSON
A. Important Distinctions the D.C. Circuit Failed to Recognize
In Johnson, the D.C. Circuit primarily relied on Central Bank of Denver v.
First Bank of Denver and Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland to conclude
that the co-conspirator theory of venue was inconsistent with 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa.87 However, the facts of Central Bank of Denver and Bankers Life are
distinguishable from Johnson such that these cases are not applicable in the
way the court relies on them.88
1. Central Bank of Denver
Central Bank of Denver is not controlling for two reasons. First, unlike
Johnson, Central Bank of Denver involved a private plaintiff, the First
Interstate Bank of Denver, who alleged secondary liability against Central
Bank under section 10(b) for aiding and abetting.89 Although private actions
have been viewed as a “necessary supplement” to the SEC’s enforcement
148, 156 n.12 (1976)). The Supreme Court had also expressly rejected using any policy
considerations when interpreting section 78aa. See Leroy, 443 U.S. at 181–82.
84. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text (listing courts that have applied
the co-conspirator theory of venue in securities cases).
85. Johnson, 650 F.3d at 715 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199
(1976)).
86. Id. at 716.
87. Id. at 714–16; Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 188 (holding that a private plaintiff
may not maintain an action for aiding and abetting under Exchange Act section 10(b)); see also
Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953) (rejecting in dictum the
use of the co-conspirator theory of venue in an antitrust case as “a frivolous albeit ingenious
attempt to expand the statute”).
88. See Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 168 (involving private plaintiffs bringing an
action for aiding and abetting securities fraud under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act); Bankers
Life & Cas. Co., 346 U.S. at 380 (involving an action brought under federal antitrust laws).
89. Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 168 (alleging a primary violation of section 10(b)
against AmWest and secondary liability against Central Bank under section 10(b) for aiding and
abetting). In a private securities fraud action, a private investor brings suit against a corporation
for personal damages resulting from securities fraud. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(1) (2006)
(governing private securities litigation). Conversely, in a public securities fraud action, the SEC
brings an action on behalf of investors to enforce the securities laws as a part of its regulation of
the securities system. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (authorizing the SEC to
bring civil suit against violators of the securities laws); The Investor’s Advocate, supra note 36.
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power,90 they are distinct from public actions, as evidenced by the PSLRA,
which was specifically enacted to control private securities actions.91
Accordingly, the interpretation and application of the securities laws in private
actions should not influence public securities actions.92
Second, Central Bank of Denver has been superseded, in its application to
SEC actions, by the PSLRA.93 Given this express authority to sue individuals
who aid and abet securities fraud, the SEC should be given leeway to bring
such actions in the same venue in which the principal actors are sued.94 The
SEC has relied on the co-conspirator theory of venue as a means of preventing
fraud and enforcing its rules,95 and the specific grant of power to bring suit
against individuals who come under secondary liability, such as aiding and
abetting, justifies the use of the co-conspirator theory of venue to effectuate
SEC authority.96
2. Bankers Life
Bankers Life is distinguishable from Johnson because in Bankers Life, the
Supreme Court was applying the co-conspirator theory under the special venue
provision of antitrust law, not securities law.97 Despite similarities between
90. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985) (“[I]mplied
private actions provide ‘a most effective weapon in the enforcement’ of the securities laws and
are ‘a necessary supplement to [SEC] action.’” (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432
(1964))).
91. See Private Sec. Litig. Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Congress has expressly recognized that private
securities actions are “an indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their
losses without having to rely upon government action” and “promote public and global
confidence in our capital markets and help[s] to deter wrongdoing and to guarantee that corporate
officers, auditors, directors, lawyers, and others properly perform their jobs.” H.R. REP.
NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731.
92. SEC v. Johnson, 650 F.3d 710, 714–15 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert denied, 131 S. Ct. 956
(2011).
93. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 158 (2008)
(recognizing that Congress specifically granted the SEC the power to prosecute aiders and
abettors of securities fraud); Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, §
104, 109 Stat. 757 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2006)); see also Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
654 F.3d 11, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (recognizing that Congress had enacted legislation allowing the
SEC to pursue actions for aiding and abetting securities fraud, in response to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Central Bank of Denver).
94. See infra notes 116–18 and accompanying text (discussing the waste of resources when
bringing similar actions against multiple defendants of the same fraud in different jurisdictions).
95. See Johnson, 650 F.3d at 714.
96. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (Supp. IV 2010); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC, 552 U.S. at 158.
97. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 380 (1953). The venue provision at
issue in Bankers Life, a suit brought under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, was 15 U.S.C. § 15,
which provides that suit may be brought “in any district court of the United States in the district
in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent.” Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 15) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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federal antitrust laws and federal securities laws, an antitrust case that rejects
the use of the co-conspirator theory of venue should not, and does not, control
the outcome of securities actions.98 The Supreme Court has specifically noted
that “securities law and antitrust law are clearly incompatible” in certain
instances.99 Further, Congress’s enactment of separate venue provisions for
securities cases and antitrust cases demonstrates that, with respect to venue,
Congress intended securities and antitrust cases to be distinct.100 Congress,
recognizing the unique intricacies of securities law issues, expressly limited the
procedural requirements for filing securities actions.101 Accordingly, the
interpretation of venue in antitrust actions should not provide any basis for the
interpretation of venue in securities actions.102
B. Co-Conspirator Theory is Consistent with 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
Contrary to the D.C. Circuit’s analysis, the co-conspirator theory of venue is
consistent with the language of 15 U.S.C. § 78aa. As discussed above, venue
under section 78aa is proper “in the district wherein any act or transaction
constituting the violation occurred . . . or in the district wherein the defendant
is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business . . . .”103 The disjunctive
language used in the statute presupposes that the listed conditions are separate:
venue is proper where the defendant resides or where any act occurred.104

98. See BLUMBERG, supra note 28, at 201 (outlining and depicting the different standards
applied in the venue statutes in (1) antitrust law; (2) patent law; (3) securities law; and (4) section
1391, the general venue provision).
99. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 279 (2007) (involving a
complaint alleging violations of antitrust laws when they formed a business agreement that
violated securities laws).
100. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa; see also Traband, supra note 30, at 247–50 (discussing the
difference between the use of the co-conspirator theory of venue in securities fraud cases and its
use in antitrust cases). Discussing the Bankers Life opinion, commercial litigation attorney Rhett
Traband states:
The key difference between application of the co-conspiracy venue theory under the
federal antitrust laws and under the federal securities laws is in the statutory basis of
each group of laws. The co-conspiracy venue theory had been used in cases alleging
Clayton Act violations to satisfy the “transact[ion] of business” requirement. Under the
securities laws, the co-conspiracy venue theory has normally been applied to create
venue where a co-conspirator acts within the forum district and does not merely
transact business there.
Id. at 250.
101. Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 284.
102. See id. at 201 (asserting that for a venue determination, “orderly analysis requires
statute-by-statute examination”).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.
104. Id.; see Ravenwoods Inv. Co. v. Bishop Capital Corp., No. 04CV9266 KHK, 2005 WL
236440, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2005) (advancing the presupposition that the listed conditions in
sectio 78aa are separate conditions).
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Additionally, despite the many changes to securities regulations by the
PSLRA, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the Dodd-Frank Act,105 the language of
§ 78aa has remained the same.106 The decision not to change the language of
§ 78aa implies that Congress believed that venue would be easy to establish
over defendants sued for aiding and abetting fraud.107 The application of the
co-conspirator theory of venue is consistent with the spirit of the broad venue
and service of process provisions in the Exchange Act that “evince an intent to
gather complex securities litigation in a single forum.”108 In order to carry out
its statutory purpose and function efficiently, the SEC should be able to sue
multiple defendants to a securities fraud scheme in a single forum.109
C. Effects on SEC Enforcement Actions
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Johnson has potentially far-reaching effects
on SEC enforcement actions.110 The SEC is headquartered in Washington,
D.C., with eleven regional offices around the country.111 Most SEC civil
enforcement actions are filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia because defendants usually file fraudulent documents at the SEC
headquarters and it is often the only available venue when there are multiple
defendants involved.112 Therefore, it can be inferred that the D.C. Circuit’s
rejection of the co-conspirator theory is particularly troubling to the SEC.

105. See supra note 45 and accompanying text; see also The Laws that Govern the Securities
Industry, supra note 33, at 4 (identifying the changes made to U.S. Securities regulation).
106. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (demonstrating that since the passage of the PSLRA in 1995,
§78aa has only been amended once, in 2010, with insignificant changes to its application).
107. See Traband, supra note 30, at 243–47 (describing the common law development of the
co-conspirator theory of venue in aiding and abetting securities law actions and noting that
courts’ interpretation of the broad purpose of 15 U.S.C. § 78aa indicated that there was little need
to change the statute language to accommodate secondary liability suits).
108. Bolton v. Gramlich, 540 F. Supp. 822, 846 (S.D.N.Y 1982); see United States v.
Johnson, 510 F.3d 521, 528 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating that a clear purpose of the Exchange Act’s
broad venue provision is “avoiding having related counts adjudicated in piecemeal fashion across
several venues”); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 205 (5th Cir. 1960).
109. Motion for Rehearing of Appellee at 13–14, SEC v. Johnson, 650 F.3d 710 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (No. 09-5399) (listing the reasons the SEC should be able to sue multiple defendants for
securities fraud in one forum to avoid cumbersome, problematic, and duplicative cases); see also
Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 188–89 (1979) (White, J., dissenting) (“Given the
underlying policy of § 27 to confer venue in a wide variety of districts in order to ease the task of
enforcement of federal securities law, it would be anomalous indeed if venue were not available
in the Northern District of Texas in this case.”).
110. Motion for Rehearing, supra note 109, at 13 (“The effect of the panel opinion is
potentially far-reaching and extremely damaging to the Commission.”).
111. SEC Organizational Chart, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/images/secorg.pdf (last visited October 20, 2012).
112. The Investor’s Advocate, supra note 36, at 2–3, 8.
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A plaintiff carefully weighs many factors in choosing a forum in which to
file a lawsuit.113 This choice of venue is important for many reasons, including
favorable laws, courts, juries, convenience, and costs.114 In addition, statistics
show that plaintiffs are successful in more than half of the cases when their
choice of venue prevails.115 Given the complexity of securities fraud schemes
in today’s global economy that involve “a wide spectrum of participants,
contributing in various ways, from various location, at various stages,”116
dismantling of the co-conspirator theory of venue will result in plaintiffs,
including the SEC, bringing multiple actions in different forums for one
scheme.117 This result is inefficient for both the plaintiff and the judicial
system as it requires multiple courts to hear the same claims, using the same
evidence, for a single fraudulent scheme.118
Further, dismantling the co-conspirator theory of venue may disincentivize
plaintiffs from suing potential defendants and decrease enforcement of
securities laws. The SEC protects investors by: (1) regulating the securities
exchange markets and imposing filing requirements or standards on companies
wishing to use the exchange markets;119 and (2) enforcing the securities
regulations in administrative and judicial proceedings.120 The use of the
co-conspirator theory of venue allows for judicial economy by decreasing
repetitious lawsuits and increasing efficiency for the parties and the courts.121
However, without the theory, a plaintiff or the SEC may be disinclined to file
lawsuits against some potential defendants, entirely defeating the statutory

113. Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for a Venue: The Need for More Limits on Choice,
50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 267, 272 (1995).
114. Id. at 271 (stating that “[v]enue choices are often based on: the party’s geographical
convenience; preference for judges in the chosen jurisdiction; preference for the substantive
and/or procedural laws in a given venue; the belief that the potential jurors in a particular
jurisdiction are more receptive to the filing party’s position; and comparisons between the trial
calendars (and/or backlogs) in the various venues”).
115. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping,
80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1511–12 (1995) (“[T]he plaintiff wins in 58% of the nontransferred
cases that go to judgment for one side or the other, but wins in only 29% of such cases in which a
transfer occurred.”).
116. Motion for Rehearing, supra note 109, at 13.
117. Id. (emphasizing that if “every defendant in the case must act in the same forum for
venue to lie . . . then the [SEC] would have to file suits involving overlapping facts in multiple
districts, with all ‘the wastefulness of time, energy and money’ for the court system and
litigants”).
118. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
119. The Investor’s Advocate, supra note 36.
120. Id. (articulating the enforcement functions of the SEC carried out by the commission’s
division of enforcement).
121. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1318 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he
inconvenience of requiring one defendant in a multi-defendant action to litigate in a distant forum
is greatly outweighed by the interest of judicial economy and bringing together in one lawsuit, all
related claims and alternative theories.”).
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purpose and goals of securities enforcement laws.122 For these reasons, it is in
the public interest to allow plaintiffs, or at a minimum, the SEC, to use the
co-conspirator theory of venue to bring civil enforcement actions against all
defendants party to one securities fraud scheme in one forum.123
IV. CONCLUSION
The D.C. Circuit in SEC v. Johnson erred in rejecting the co-conspirator
theory of venue. The co-conspirator theory of venue is consistent with the
statutory purpose of the securities fraud venue provision and necessary to
protect the public interest. Just as Congress addressed the SEC’s authority to
enforce aiding and abetting liability after Central Bank of Denver, Congress
should amend the venue provisions to clarify that the co-conspirator theory of
liability applies in such actions. With no remedial action by Congress or the
Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit’s decision could mean the end of the
co-conspirator theory of venue in securities fraud actions. Given the
complexity of business transactions today, it is now more important than ever
to maintain the protections enforced by the SEC and allow one suit to be
brought against all perpetrators of a securities fraud scheme in one forum.

122. See In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litig., 338 F. Supp 438, 440 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (adopting the
co-conspirator theory of venue because, without it, the result would be “[a]n unnecessary
multiplicity of suits and fragmenting of the issues involved”); see also United States v. Johnson,
510 F.3d 521, 528 (4th Cir. 2007); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 205 (5th
Cir. 1960); Motion for Rehearing, supra note 109, at 14 (discussing the negative impact of the
D.C. Circuit’s decision on SEC enforcement actions and arguing that “[i]t might be necessary to
forgo suit altogether against certain fraud participants based purely on their location or to skew
the choice of forum for the entire case to a place inconvenient to all but one important wrongdoer.
These consequences would flow not from statutory language, Supreme Court precedent,
considered policy, or law enforcement judgment, but perversely from the way in which the
mastermind of the fraud devised it and divided labor among those best situated to accomplish it”).
123. See Johnson, 510 F.3d at 528 (asserting that the abandonment of the co-conspirator
theory of venue would be problematic for defendants and prosecutors, as well as other interested
third parties, as it would require preparation for multiple trials).

